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IaaS shared responsibility as a control list: who patches, logs and backs up what

Technical article
Cloud

About this article: AI-assisted writing, reviewed against the cited sources. This is source research, not a lab validation of the procedures. Check the stated versions and your own recovery requirements before making changes.

On infrastructure as a service, the provider runs the facilities, physical hosts, physical network and virtualisation layer. You own the guest operating system and everything above it, plus network rules, identities and data. Patching the guest, collecting its logs and backing it up are your work, and the provider's tools for those jobs generally need someone to configure them. Some defaults are active regardless, as Azure's patch modes show.

A responsibility diagram does not show that. A control list does: one row per control, with the owner, the state it is in until you act, and the evidence that proves it is running.

The vendor statements below were checked on 10 November 2026. The commands come from vendor CLI references and were written up for this article. None was run in a lab.

Why it matters

The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) says the risk work is shared between tenant and provider, but organisations "are ultimately responsible for protecting their data" and its confidentiality, integrity and availability.

The Information Security Manual (ISM) control ISM-1569 requires a shared responsibility model to be "created, documented and shared between suppliers and their customers". A vendor's web page is an input to that document. It is not the document.

Microsoft says its own matrix is illustrative guidance and not intended to convey legal conclusions or to change any agreement. The contract governs, so a control list built from public pages still has to be checked against yours.

Google states: "Many cloud security breaches are the direct result of misconfiguration". Most of the rows below are configuration items.

How the boundary is drawn

The three providers put the line in nearly the same place for virtual machines.

Provider Provider side Customer side
AWS "From the host operating system and virtualization layer down to the physical security of the facilities" Guest OS "including updates and security patches", application software, security group configuration. For EC2, also credentials and the IAM roles attached to instances
Microsoft Azure Physical hosts, physical network, physical datacentre, hypervisor Data, configuration, identities, client devices, applications, network controls, operating system
Google Cloud Underlying infrastructure and physical security "The bulk of the security responsibilities", and always access policies and data

AWS also sorts controls into three classes. Inherited controls, such as physical and environmental protection, come entirely from the provider. Shared controls, such as patch management, have a part on each side. Customer-specific controls, such as zone security, are yours alone.

ASD's October 2026 Essentials for cloud uses a similar set of markers: Customer, Supplied and Provider-inherited. Supplied means the provider supplies the capability, but the customer "must enable, configure and operate it".

That publication is written for software and platform services, and ASD points organisations with direct control over compute and networking towards Essentials for enterprise IT. Borrowing the Supplied marker for IaaS is an editorial choice here. It is useful because it names the state where most of the rows below sit: the feature exists, and nothing happens until you turn it on.

The control list

This table is an editorial synthesis of the vendor pages linked in the sections that follow. "State until you act" describes what those pages say about the default.

Control Provider does You do State until you act Evidence that proves it
Physical and host security All of it Collect the provider's assurance reports Inherited Current third-party report, read for scope
Host maintenance Performs it and gives notice Watch notices, design for restarts Happens regardless Notice route tested, restart runbook
Guest OS patching Publishes tools Choose scope, schedule, reboot rules Not your provider's job; a default may already be patching Actual patch mode and per-VM patch state, by date
Application patching Nothing All of it Yours alone Version inventory against vendor advisories
Control-plane audit Records it Extend retention, protect, review Retention varies by provider Trail or sink status, retained copy
Resource and data-access logs Offers the feature Enable per service Mostly off Diagnostic settings, event selectors, audit config
Guest OS logs Offers an agent Install, configure, ship Not collected Agent status, recent entries at destination
Backup Offers the service Policy, scope, retention, protection Not configured Last good recovery point per VM
Restore testing Offers tooling on some platforms Run and record it Not done Dated test with result and duration
Network rules Enforces them Write them Your configuration Rule export, reviewed
Identity and access Provides the service Accounts, roles, multi-factor sign-in Your configuration Role review, privileged access logs
Data classification and encryption decisions Offers mechanisms Decide and apply Your decision Register entry per data set
Zone and region resilience Runs the zones and regions Deploy across them Single location unless designed otherwise Failover test record

Provider resilience follows the same line. AWS says EC2 "requires the customer to perform all of the necessary resiliency configuration and management tasks". Microsoft says that with IaaS "you typically need to plan and implement many reliability capabilities yourself".

Host maintenance: the provider's action, your outage

Host maintenance is the row teams leave off. You do not perform it, but your service absorbs it.

Patching: three tools, one gap

The provider's tools decide how patches reach a VM. They do not decide whether your timing is good enough.

AWS. AWS recommends you regularly patch and update instances, and Patch Manager automates it for managed nodes through patch baselines. The command below reports on managed nodes, so an instance that Systems Manager does not manage needs checking another way.

aws ssm describe-instance-patch-states --instance-ids i-0123456789abcdef0

The output gives MissingCount, FailedCount, CriticalNonCompliantCount and InstalledPendingRebootCount. Editorial reading: a non-zero pending-reboot count means a patch is installed but may not yet be in effect.

Azure. Automatic VM guest patching applies patches classified Critical or Security during off-peak hours, and it includes rebooting as configured. It has to be enabled, by setting the patch mode to AutomaticByPlatform, and only on supported platform images. With no patch mode specified, a Windows VM is set to AutomaticByOS, which installs patches through Automatic Updates, and a Linux VM to ImageDefault, which honours the image's patching configuration. An untouched Windows VM can therefore already be installing updates. Record each VM's actual patch mode.

Timing is the catch: "Patches are installed within 30 days of the monthly patch releases". Azure Update Manager adds optional assessments every 24 hours and scheduling. Results of assessments and installations are stored in Azure Resource Graph.

az vm assess-patches -g MyResourceGroup -n MyVm

This command assesses patches on the VM.

Google Cloud. VM Manager needs the OS Config API enabled, the OS Config agent installed on each VM, and instance metadata set to activate it. Patch deployments then schedule patch jobs.

gcloud compute os-config patch-jobs list
gcloud compute os-config patch-jobs list-instance-details PATCH_JOB

These are from the patch-jobs list and list-instance-details references.

The timeframe the tool does not set

The Essential Eight maturity model (November 2023 release) gives timeframes for operating systems.

Operating system on Critical, or working exploit exists Non-critical, no working exploit
Internet-facing servers and network devices, all levels Within 48 hours of release Within two weeks
Non-internet-facing servers, network devices and workstations, Levels One and Two Within one month Within one month
Non-internet-facing servers, network devices and workstations, Level Three Within 48 hours Within one month

The same model expects a vulnerability scanner at least daily for operating systems of internet-facing servers and network devices, and at least fortnightly for the others.

Editorial reading: a 30-day installation window, on its own, cannot meet a 48-hour requirement. If an internet-facing VM is in scope, it needs an out-of-cycle route such as an on-demand patch job. A monthly schedule does not provide one.

Logging: three layers, three different defaults

Treat these as separate controls. Each has a different owner action.

Control-plane audit. This records who did what to cloud resources.

  • AWS event history keeps the past 90 days of management events per Region. A trail delivers them onward, and AWS recommends a multi-Region trail.
  • The Azure activity log is kept for 90 days and then deleted, unless a diagnostic setting sends it elsewhere.
  • Google Cloud Admin Activity audit logs are always written and cannot be disabled. They land in the _Required bucket, which has a fixed 400-day retention. The _Default bucket defaults to 30 days.

Resource and data-access logs. These are the reads and writes against the data, and they are the ones an investigation asks for.

Guest OS logs. The provider cannot see inside your VM without help. Microsoft states that without the agent "you can collect data only from the host machine". AWS uses the CloudWatch agent and Google the Ops Agent. Each has to be installed and configured.

These read-only commands show the state of the first two layers.

# AWS: trails, whether each is logging, and what it selects
aws cloudtrail describe-trails
aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name my-trail
aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name my-trail

# Azure: subscription-level and per-resource diagnostic settings
az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription list
az monitor diagnostic-settings list --resource RESOURCE_ID

# Google Cloud: audit configuration and log routing
gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID
gcloud logging sinks list

Reference for the last command.

Output Editorial reading
get-trail-status shows IsLogging false The trail exists but is not recording
describe-trails shows IsMultiRegionTrail false Events in other Regions are not captured by this trail
get-event-selectors shows an empty DataResources No data events are selected by that classic selector. Advanced selectors, if used, appear separately
diagnostic-settings list returns nothing for a resource No resource logs are leaving that resource
get-iam-policy has no auditConfigs section No project-level Data Access configuration exists, and settings inherited from a folder or organisation still need checking

What the Australian baseline adds

The Essential Eight's requirements on event log protection and analysis start at Maturity Level Two, and are not in Level One. There, event logs are "protected from unauthorised modification and deletion" and logs from internet-facing servers are analysed in a timely manner to detect cyber security events. Those lines sit inside named strategies and follow named event types: multi-factor authentication, privileged access, privileged account and security group management, application control, PowerShell, and command line process creation events. Our reading: this is not a general rule for all cloud logs.

ASD's tenant guidance asks for "detailed time-synchronised logs and real-time alerts", covering both the accounts that administer the service and what runs in it, such as operating system, web server and application logs.

So a retained copy in a place the workload's administrators cannot alter is a design requirement, not a nice-to-have. That inference is editorial.

Backup: the feature exists, the outcome is yours

AWS is plain about the customer's resiliency tasks on EC2: "Failure management requires backing up data". Microsoft notes that backups "might be automatic, manual, or both", so a service's own page has to be read, not assumed.

Platform feature What the page states What it leaves to you
EBS snapshots Incremental; replicated across Availability Zones in the Region Schedule, retention, a copy outside the Region
AWS Backup Vault Lock In Compliance mode after grace time, cannot be altered or deleted by customer, account owner or AWS while it holds recovery points Choosing the mode and the retention
Azure VM Backup Agent-based application or file-consistent, or agentless crash-consistent, chosen in the policy. Azure Backup also takes crash-consistent backups if the VM is not running or application/file-consistent backups fail Whether crash consistency is enough, and each recovery point's actual type
Azure soft delete 14 days by default, extendable to 180; default enforcement described as in preview for Recovery Services vaults Confirming the state on your vault
Google Backup and DR vaults Backup vault enforces write once, read many immutability and indelibility Enrolling workloads and setting retention
Google snapshot schedules Google describes them as a best practice for backing up Compute Engine workloads Creating and attaching the schedule

The inventory commands below answer "what is covered", which is a different question from "will it restore".

aws backup list-protected-resources
aws backup list-restore-jobs --by-status COMPLETED
az backup item list --resource-group MyResourceGroup --vault-name MyVault --backup-management-type AzureIaasVM
gcloud compute snapshots list

These come from the list-restore-jobs, az backup item and gcloud compute snapshots list references.

Note the wording on list-protected-resources: it returns resources with recovery points "regardless of the recovery point's status". Appearing in that list does not prove a recovery point is usable.

Evidence of restoration has to come from a restore. AWS Backup offers restore testing, with automated and periodic evaluation of restore viability and job duration.

The Essential Eight requires, from Level One, that restoration to a common point in time is "tested as part of disaster recovery exercises" (also ISM-1515).

ASD's tenant guidance goes further. Against data becoming unavailable through corruption, deletion or the provider terminating the account, it recommends up-to-date encrypted backups, in a format avoiding provider lock-in, stored offline at the tenant's premises or at a second provider requiring multi-factor authentication to modify or delete data, with the recovery process tested annually. A snapshot in the same account does not meet that description.

What to choose and why

These are editorial recommendations.

Situation Choice Reason
Starting from a vendor diagram One row per control, with owner, default, evidence and review date A diagram cannot be audited
Control marked as inherited Keep the provider's report and read its scope AWS points to third-party attestations to determine inherited controls, and Google says inherited controls can serve as audit evidence
Internet-facing VM Automated cycle plus a tested on-demand patch route The 48-hour window is shorter than a monthly cycle
Long-lived investigation needs Send control-plane logs to storage the workload administrators cannot change Default retention varies by provider, and logs can be needed after it ends
Enabling data-level logging Enable by data sensitivity and estimate volume first AWS charges extra, and every extra log has to be stored and reviewed
Database or transactional VM Application-consistent backup, with a tested restore Crash consistency leaves recovery to the application
Critical data A copy outside the provider account, tested Matches ASD's tenant guidance on account loss

Work in this order: build the row list, record the current state using read-only queries, fix the rows with no evidence, then assign a named owner and a review date to each.

Risks and limits

Warning: Turning on automatic patching can reboot VMs. Azure's automatic guest patching includes rebooting as configured, and a Google patch job's default reboot setting lets the agent decide, and multiple reboots may occur. Test on a non-production VM and agree a window first.

Warning: AWS Backup Vault Lock in Compliance mode is deliberately irreversible after the grace time. A mistaken retention setting cannot be undone by you or AWS while the vault holds recovery points. Rehearse with a test vault.

Warning: Enabling data-level audit logs can raise volume and cost quickly. Estimate before enabling across an account, and apply it by data sensitivity.

  • az vm assess-patches is not a passive read. The reference describes it as assessing patches on the VM, with az vm install-patches as the separate install command. It is still an operation against the VM, so treat it as a change-window item on sensitive systems.
  • Public pages are not your contract. Microsoft's note applies generally, so confirm the split against your agreement and any regulatory obligations. AWS itself says responsibility varies with the services used, their integration and applicable laws.
  • Maturity levels are not a legal standard for every reader. Whether the Essential Eight or ISM applies to you depends on your organisation. They are used here as a concrete Australian yardstick.
  • Managed services move the line. This article covers virtual machines. Each managed service has its own split.
  • Default states change. Azure's soft delete enforcement was in preview when checked, for example. Query the real state rather than relying on a table.
  • Not tested here. Commands and readings come from vendor documentation only.

Sources

Opened 10 November 2026. Sources behind the corrections reopened 10 November 2026.