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Kerberos fails after the RC4 change: finding the accounts and devices that still depend on RC4

Technical article
Troubleshooting

About this article: This article is reviewed against the cited sources. This is source research, not lab validation. Check the stated versions and your own requirements before making changes.

A file share now gives a network error, remote PowerShell fails with 0x80090342, or a storage appliance, Linux server or Java application that signs in with a keytab stops working. Nothing obvious changed apart from domain controller updates or a new encryption policy.

The likely cause is RC4. Microsoft has been removing RC4 as the encryption Kerberos assumes when an account has no explicit setting, because RC4 tickets can be cracked offline ("Kerberoasting") (Microsoft Learn, Detect and remediate RC4 usage in Kerberos). Anything that can only use RC4 now fails unless it has been set up for it on purpose.

What changed, and when

Microsoft's schedule in KB5073381 (CVE-2026-20833) is (Microsoft Support, KB5073381):

Updates released What happens on domain controllers
From 13 January 2026 Audit phase. New KDCSVC warning events 201, 202, 206 and 207 show where RC4 would stop working. Event 205 flags an explicit DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes setting that allows RC4.
From 14 April 2026 Enforcement with manual rollback. The default DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes becomes AES-SHA1 only (0x18) for accounts with no explicit setting. The RC4DefaultDisablementPhase registry value can still move a domain controller back to audit.
July 2026 and later The rollback value is no longer supported.

An explicit DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes value on a domain controller is always honoured; only the default changes.

Separately, domain controllers running Windows Server 2025 do not issue RC4 ticket-granting tickets at all, so devices that can only use RC4 cannot sign in with Kerberos through them (Microsoft Learn, Detect and remediate RC4).

What you see

  • SMB: opening a share on a server whose account only allows RC4 gives a network error.
  • Remote PowerShell: New-PSSession fails with "WinRM cannot process the request. The following error with errorcode 0x80090342 occurred while using Kerberos authentication: An unknown security error occurred."
  • Non-Windows services: Microsoft says the most common case is a device using a keytab exported with only RC4 keys, while the service account in Active Directory has AES keys and no explicit encryption setting.
  • On domain controllers, System log, source Kdcsvc:
    • 201 / 202 (warning, audit phase): RC4 "will be unsupported in enforcement phase" because the service has no msds-SupportedEncryptionTypes and either the client only offers RC4 (201) or the service account only has RC4 keys (202).
    • 203 / 204 (enforcement): the same two cases, now blocked.
    • 206 / 207 (audit) and 208 / 209 (enforcement): the service or domain controller is set to AES-SHA1 only, but the client does not offer AES (206/208) or the service account has no AES keys (207/209).
    • 205: an explicit DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes that still allows RC4. Logged at every KDC start; it never turns into an error.

Why it happens

Kerberos picks the ticket's encryption from what the client offers, what the service account supports (msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes) and what keys the account actually has. Three things leave an account stuck on RC4:

  • No AES keys. An account created before AES support and whose password was never changed since. AES support was added in Windows Server 2003; changing the password creates the AES keys.
  • No explicit setting, so the domain controller falls back to DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes, which no longer includes RC4 by default.
  • A device that cannot do AES: Windows Server 2003 or earlier, or a third-party device or keytab limited to RC4.

How to prove the cause

All read-only. You need rights to read the Security log on domain controllers (Domain Admins or equivalent).

1. Read the Kdcsvc events (201–209) in the System log on each domain controller. Each names the account, the service, the service's msds-SupportedEncryptionTypes, its available keys and the encryption types the client advertised.

2. Read Security events 4768 and 4769 on domain controllers (Windows Server 2019 and later; 2016 from the January 2025 update). A failed request shows Failure Code 0xE, which is KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP. Successful tickets show the ticket encryption type: 0x17 is RC4-HMAC, 0x11 and 0x12 are AES.

3. Ask for a ticket directly from the computer that fails:

klist get HOST/<server FQDN>

A failure caused by this shows "The encryption type requested is not supported by the KDC."

4. Check the target account's setting. In PowerShell with the Active Directory module:

$accountName = "<computer account name>"
$parameters = @{
     Filter     = "Name -eq '$($accountName)' -and (ObjectClass -eq 'Computer' -or ObjectClass -eq 'User')"
     Properties = "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes"
}
Get-ADObject @parameters | FL "DistinguishedName","msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes","Name","ObjectClass"

The value is a decimal bit mask: 4 is RC4 only, 24 (hex 0x18) is AES 128 and AES 256, 28 (0x1C) is RC4 plus both AES. Microsoft's example failure is an account set to 0x4.

5. Find RC4 use across the domain. Microsoft publishes two scripts in its Kerberos-Crypto GitHub repository. Download them from that repository only, read each script before running it, and run it on a domain controller as administrator:

.\List-AccountKeys.ps1
.\Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 -Encryption RC4

The first lists the keys each account has; the second lists Kerberos tickets that used RC4, with source and target.

The fix

Fix the account or device, not the whole domain:

  • Account has no AES keys: change its password. For a service account, plan the change with whatever uses the password.
  • Account is set to RC4 only, or has no setting: set its msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes to include AES. For computer accounts, Microsoft points to the Group Policy setting Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos (Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options) with AES128_HMAC_SHA1 and AES256_HMAC_SHA1 ticked; after the computer restarts it updates its own attribute.
  • Non-Windows device or keytab: Microsoft's first recommendation is to work with the vendor, for example to export a keytab with AES keys. If that is not possible, set msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes on that one service account to RC4 with AES session keys (0x24) (Microsoft Support, KB5073381).
  • Device that cannot do AES at all (Windows Server 2003 or older): migrate it. For a third-party device, Microsoft invites details at stillneedrc4@microsoft.com.

Microsoft's last resort is setting DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes to 0x24 on every domain controller. Microsoft warns this leaves every account in the domain exposed to CVE-2026-20833; avoid it if any per-account fix is possible.

How to confirm the fix

  • klist get HOST/<server FQDN> (or the service's SPN) now returns a ticket.
  • The share, remote PowerShell session or device sign-in works.
  • .\Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 -Encryption RC4 no longer lists that source and target, or lists only the accounts you deliberately allowed.
  • No new Kdcsvc 203, 204, 208 or 209 events for that account.

What to watch afterwards

  • Kdcsvc 201–209 on every domain controller. By November 2026 a fully updated domain controller is past the audit phase and enforcing, and the rollback value no longer works. Events 201 and 202 appear where the service has no msds-SupportedEncryptionTypes setting and RC4 is still in use; Microsoft says neither is logged if DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes is manually defined. Events 206 and 207 appear where the service or the domain default is set to AES-SHA1 only. Treat any 203, 204, 208 or 209 event as a live failure to fix, and check new accounts and services as they are added.
  • Event 205 at KDC start means someone set a domain-wide default that still allows RC4.
  • Accounts you allowed RC4 on purpose. Keep a list and remove the exception once the vendor fixes the device.
  • New non-Windows integrations. Microsoft notes that the absence of audit events does not guarantee every non-Windows device will accept Kerberos after the change; test new ones before relying on them.

Risks and limits

  • Turning RC4 back on domain-wide, by DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes or the encryption-types Group Policy on domain controllers, reopens the weakness for every account.
  • Changing a service account's password breaks anything still using the old password, such as a keytab exported before the change.
  • If you have devices that can only use RC4, Windows Server 2025 domain controllers will not serve them, as noted above.
  • On Windows Server 2022 and earlier, the processed msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes value shown in events 4768/4769 always includes DES and RC4 for compatibility, whatever the account is set to.

Sources

Next step

RC4 problems are best found in the domain controller logs before users find them, then fixed one account or device at a time. NetLeverage has looked after business servers since 2002. If a share, remote session or appliance stopped signing in after domain controller updates, talk to us through managed support with the Kdcsvc event IDs and the account names they show.