About this article: This article is reviewed against the cited sources. This is source research, not lab validation. Check the stated versions and your own requirements before making changes.
Partly. NTFS lets you give a backup account the right to create files in a folder without the right to delete them, overwrite them or rename them. If that account's password is stolen, the thief can add files but cannot remove the history. That is real protection, and it costs nothing.
It is not immutability. Microsoft documents several ways round it that sit outside the backup account: the file's owner, anyone with Full Control, administrators who can take ownership, and accounts holding the backup and restore privileges. Treat an NTFS "create-only" folder as protection against a stolen backup credential, not against a compromised file server.
What do the separate NTFS rights allow?
NTFS splits "write" into several rights, and Microsoft's permission table keeps them apart. The table below combines that table with the Win32 access-right constants.
| Right (as named in Windows) | On a folder | On a file | Source detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| Create Files / Write Data | Create files in the folder | Change the file and overwrite existing content | Win32 names: FILE_ADD_FILE and FILE_WRITE_DATA |
| Create Folders / Append Data | Create subfolders | Add to the end of the file, without changing, deleting or overwriting existing data | Win32 name: FILE_APPEND_DATA |
| Delete | Delete the folder | Delete the file | If you lack it on a file, you can still delete the file with Delete Subfolders and Files on the parent folder |
| Delete Subfolders and Files | Delete anything inside, even where Delete was not granted | Not applicable | Win32 name: FILE_DELETE_CHILD |
| Change Permissions | Change the ACL | Change the ACL | Whoever holds it can grant themselves anything |
| Take Ownership | Take ownership | Take ownership | The owner can always change permissions |
Microsoft's DeleteFile reference states the deletion rule in one line: "To delete or rename a file, you must have either delete permission on the file, or delete child permission in the parent directory." For a create-only design that rule is the lock. If the backup account holds neither Delete on the files nor Delete Subfolders and Files on the folder, it can neither delete nor rename what it wrote.
The same table warns that groups granted Full Control on a folder "can delete any files in that folder, regardless of the permissions protecting the file". Keep the backup account well away from Full Control and from Modify.
One caution on append. The Win32 page says that for local files, write operations do not overwrite existing data if append is granted without write data. Microsoft's pages do not say how the same right behaves for a client writing over SMB, so test it rather than assume it.
What does Microsoft's own "drop folder" pattern show?
Microsoft's file-server guidance describes a drop folder: a place where users can drop reports that only a manager can read. It grants the Users group the Write permission "applied to This Folder only", and Full Control to the group manager. The backup version is the same shape: the backup account gets create rights on the folder, nothing on the files, and a separate administrator account does the clean-up.
The same section carries the catch. It says that as the creator of a file, the user "has the ability to Read and Change the permission on the file independent of any permissions that are granted explicitly". The creator is the owner, and Microsoft states elsewhere that "the owner can always change permissions on an object, even when denied all access to the object."
Reading those two statements together (this is reasoning, not a vendor statement): the account that creates a backup file owns it, so it could rewrite the file's permissions and grant itself delete. A thief holding that account can do the same. The create-only design is therefore weaker than it looks until the owner's implicit rights are dealt with.
Can the owner's implicit rights be removed?
Microsoft's list of well-known security identifiers includes OWNER RIGHTS (S-1-3-4). Its description: when an ACE carrying this SID is applied to an object, "the system ignores the implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC standard access rights for the object owner." The CREATOR OWNER SID (S-1-3-0) is a different thing: a placeholder in inheritable ACEs that is replaced by the SID of whoever creates the object.
Going by that description, an OWNER RIGHTS entry on the backup folder should stop the creator from changing permissions on what it creates. Microsoft's description does not come with a worked backup example, so build it on a scratch folder and prove it with a scratch account before using it.
Who can still delete the backups?
| Who | Why they can still act | Source |
|---|---|---|
| The backup account, if it is the owner and no OWNER RIGHTS entry exists | The owner can always change permissions | How Permissions Work |
| Anyone with Full Control, Modify with Delete, or Delete Subfolders and Files on the folder | Delete is granted directly or through the parent | How Permissions Work; DeleteFile |
| Members of Administrators | By default the Take ownership user right is held by Administrators, and an owner can change permissions | Take ownership security policy; How Permissions Work |
| Accounts with the Back up files and directories or Restore files and directories rights | These privileges bypass file and directory permissions for backup and restore operations. Restore also allows setting a valid principal as owner | Security policy pages; File security and access rights |
| Anyone who can sign in to the file server and run as one of the above | Share permissions do not restrict users working at the server | How Permissions Work |
Microsoft states that when rights conflict, "a privilege overrides a permission". The Back up files and directories right is effective, per its policy page, "only when an application attempts access through the NTFS backup application programming interface". By default it is held by Administrators and Backup Operators. The Restore page lists the write and ownership side: it does not say "delete", so do not read it as a delete bypass. The chain "restore right, set owner, change permissions, delete" is reasoning from the pieces, not a vendor statement.
Why do backup programs break on a create-only folder?
A create-only folder suits software that writes each backup once, to a new file name, and never touches it again. Many tools do not work like that. They write a temporary file and rename it, extend a file between runs, rewrite an index, or delete expired files at the end of a job. Each of those needs rights the design withholds.
Microsoft's own tool shows the pattern. For a Windows Server Backup job to a remote shared folder, the wbadmin page says that a second backup of the same computer to the same folder overwrites the previous one. Overwriting needs rights a create-only account does not have, so a job like that would be expected to fail. The page does not discuss this case, so test it first.
The opposite failure is quieter. If retention clean-up runs as the same restricted account, it fails with access denied and the share only grows. Decide who prunes before you restrict anyone. A separate account, signing in from a different machine, should hold the delete rights, and its credentials should sit outside the directory the backup server trusts.
Do share permissions help?
Microsoft says a shared folder has two sets of permission entries, the share permissions and the NTFS permissions, that they are independent, and that "the more restrictive permissions are then applied". The Set-SmbPathAcl reference describes the same split from the other side: it sets the folder's ACL to match the share's ACL, which means the two lists are separate objects that can differ.
Two practical points follow. Set both lists deliberately: a share permission of Change is enough for a create-only design if NTFS withholds delete. And never run Set-SmbPathAcl against a folder whose NTFS permissions you have designed, because it replaces them with a copy of the share's list.
Share permissions apply only to network access, so they cannot protect against someone signed in at the server.
Example (illustrative): a 2 TB volume that fills in 50 nights
backup01 sends 40 GB of backup files a night to \\fs01\backups on a 2 TB (2,000 GB) data volume. The account svc-backup has create rights on the folder only. Nothing deletes anything, as designed.
- Volume capacity: 2,000 GB.
- Nightly addition: 40 GB.
- Nights before the volume is full: 2,000 ÷ 40 = 50.
- If the backups must be kept for 30 nights, a pruning account is needed, because after night 50 every job fails with the volume full.
If a pruning job running as a separate account on adm01 removes files older than 30 nights, the steady state is 30 × 40 = 1,200 GB, which leaves 800 GB spare. The permissions did their job; the missing piece was an owner for clean-up.
How do I check this on my own system?
Read first, change second. Run these on the file server in an elevated prompt.
- Show the folder's permissions. Per Microsoft, icacls "displays or modifies discretionary access control lists", so run it with only the path:
icacls D:\backups. Look for every account holding Full Control, Modify, Delete (D) or Delete child (DC), and for OWNER RIGHTS and CREATOR OWNER entries. - Show the share's own list:
Get-SmbShareAccess -Name backups. Microsoft describes it as retrieving "the ACL of the SMB share". - List who holds the Back up files and directories, Restore files and directories and Take ownership rights in the local security policy.
- On a scratch folder with the same permissions and a scratch account, sign in as that account and try, in order: create a file; open it again and overwrite it; append to it; rename it; delete it; change its permissions. Write down which succeed. Only the first should, plus append if your tool needs it.
- Ask your backup software's vendor in writing whether a normal job creates, renames, overwrites, appends to or deletes anything in the target folder, and which account runs retention.
Disruptive step: changing permissions can stop backups at the next run and can lock out people who rely on the folder. Back out by saving the lists first and restoring them if needed. Microsoft's icacls page shows the pattern icacls D:\backups\* /save acl-before.txt /t to store the lists of the matching files and icacls D:\backups\ /restore acl-before.txt to apply them. That pattern covers the contents, not the folder's own list, so also keep the printed output of icacls D:\backups. A mistaken /deny or removed inheritance does not undo itself.
A grant for the backup account could look like icacls D:\backups /grant svc-backup:(WD,AD), where Microsoft's page defines WD as write data or add file and AD as append data or add subdirectory. Microsoft's page does not state how far a grant without inheritance flags applies, so read the result back with icacls D:\backups and in the folder's advanced security dialog before you rely on it.
Read next
Related articles you may want next.
- Backup & RecoveryLogical air gap and physical air gap for backup repositoriesWhat offline and logically isolated backup copies each stop, where they fail, and how CISA and NIST describe a copy an attacker cannot reach.Read article
- Backup & RecoveryWhen the backup administrator is compromised: break-glass recovery authorityWho may release a recovery copy after the backup administrator's accounts are untrusted, and which credentials must sit outside the lost directory.Read article
- Backup & RecoveryPrevious Versions and shadow copies are not a backup: what they are good for, and where they stopUnderstand local Windows shadow-copy dependencies, automatic deletion, administrative access and why independent retained backups still matter.Read article
Risks and limits
- These commands have not been run or lab-tested. The permission semantics come from Microsoft pages written for Windows Server 2003 to 2012 and for the Win32 file API; current Windows Server releases are not separately confirmed.
- Create-only protects against a stolen backup account, not against a compromised file server, a domain administrator, or malware running with administrator rights on the server.
- The account can still fill the volume with new files. Create-only does not limit how much is written.
- A create-only folder does not make a copy immutable. Copies that must survive an administrator need a separate system, offline media or storage whose retention is enforced by a different party.
- Shadow copies on the same volume are not a backup, and an administrator can remove them.
- The chain from owner to delete and from restore right to delete is reasoning from separate Microsoft statements, not a vendor statement and not a Microsoft-documented attack.
Sources
- How Permissions Work — Microsoft Learn archive, Windows Server 2003 to 2012, last updated 3 July 2013, accessed 17 November 2026
- File Access Rights Constants — Microsoft Learn, last updated 7 January 2021, accessed 17 November 2026
- File security and access rights — Microsoft Learn, last updated 9 July 2025, accessed 17 November 2026
- DeleteFileW function — Microsoft Learn, last updated 4 January 2024, accessed 17 November 2026
- Security Identifiers — Microsoft Learn, Windows Server 2016 to 2025, last updated 26 June 2025, accessed 17 November 2026
- icacls — Microsoft Learn, Windows Server 2016 to 2025, last updated 9 June 2025, accessed 17 November 2026
- Take ownership of files or other objects — Microsoft Learn, last updated 19 April 2017, accessed 17 November 2026
- Back up files and directories — Microsoft Learn, accessed 17 November 2026
- Restore files and directories — Microsoft Learn, accessed 17 November 2026
- Set-SmbPathAcl — Microsoft Learn, accessed 17 November 2026
- Get-SmbShareAccess — Microsoft Learn, accessed 17 November 2026
- wbadmin start backup — Microsoft Learn, Windows Server 2016 to 2025, last updated 3 February 2023, accessed 17 November 2026
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