About this article: This article is reviewed against the cited sources. This is source research, not lab validation. Check the stated versions and your own requirements before making changes.
A surprise certificate expiry usually involves a certificate that nobody remembered: one a former staff member requested, a test system that became production, or a supplier's service using a name on your domain. You cannot renew what you do not know exists. This guide shows how to build a reasonably complete list.
The short answer is to use two lists and compare them. The first comes from certificate transparency (CT) logs, which are public, append-only records of certificates that public certificate authorities (CAs) have issued. Search them for your domain names. The second comes from reading each service you operate and recording the certificate it actually presents. A certificate in the first list and not the second is a question. So is one in the second and not the first. Neither list is complete on its own, and we say below what each misses.
Why it matters
Expiry warnings depend on someone being on the receiving end. Let's Encrypt, a widely used CA, announced that it would end expiration notification emails, saying: "We will be ending this service on June 4, 2025." (Let's Encrypt announcement). Its stated reasons include that more subscribers now automate renewal. Our reading: a certificate that was issued by hand, for a name nobody tracks, and not renewed by automation, may now expire without any warning reaching a person.
There is a security reason as well. A US government advisory about DNS hijacking campaigns says attackers who control the DNS records of a domain can also obtain valid certificates for it, and recommends that defenders "Search for encryption certificates related to domains and revoke any fraudulently requested certificates." (CISA AA19-024A, read through an archive copy). CT logs are the practical way to carry out that search.
What a CT log is
RFC 6962 describes logs as publicly auditable, append-only and untrusted. It says logs do not themselves prevent misissue, and its section on detecting misissue puts the consequence plainly: "The logs do not themselves detect misissued certificates; they rely instead on interested parties, such as domain owners, to monitor them and take corrective action when a misissue is detected". That sentence is the point of this article: someone has to look.
The Certificate Transparency project explains the flow. A CA creates a precertificate (a version of the certificate that browsers will not accept), sends it to logs, and receives signed certificate timestamps (SCTs), which are promises of inclusion. The final certificate carries those timestamps. Monitors are services that read the logs and can alert domain owners. The project's page of monitors lists several, including services that send an email when a certificate is issued for a monitored domain. We have not evaluated any of them.
Browsers push CAs to log. Chrome's policy says certificates must carry enough timestamps from qualifying logs to count as compliant (Chrome CT policy), and Apple's policy says certificates that fail it "will result in a failed TLS connection" (Apple support). Our reading: a publicly trusted certificate for a website is therefore very likely to appear in a log, usually within a day, because the log's maximum merge delay is usually 24 hours according to the CT project.
Two version notes. RFC 9162 describes CT version 2.0 and obsoletes RFC 6962, but both are labelled Experimental, and Apple's page still refers to RFC 6962 compliance. Let's Encrypt says it now runs static-design logs and has an end-of-life plan for its older RFC 6962 logs (Let's Encrypt CT logs). As a certificate owner you do not need to choose a protocol. You need a search or monitoring service that reads the logs for you.
What CT logs show, and what they do not
They show certificates issued by CAs that log, for any name, regardless of who asked. A search on your domain should therefore reveal certificates requested by staff, by suppliers and by anyone who could pass domain validation.
They do not show:
- Certificates from a private CA, such as an internal one, because RFC 6962 says each submitted chain must be rooted in a known CA certificate.
- Self-signed certificates.
- Where a certificate is installed. A log entry has no server address.
- Whether a certificate is still in use.
Every name in a logged certificate becomes public. Our reading: if you have used a public CA for an internal system name, that name is already searchable by anyone. That is a reason to review naming, not a reason to avoid CT.
In our understanding, one issuance can appear as more than one entry, because precertificates are logged as well as certificates, which can look like duplicates. Expect old, expired certificates too.
What endpoint reads show, and what they do not
Connecting to a service and reading the certificate it presents shows what real users and systems will get. It also catches certificates from private CAs, and self-signed ones. But you can only read the endpoints you know to look at. A forgotten server on an address you did not scan, or on a port you did not try, stays invisible.
Check each name and each port separately. A web server on port 443, a mail server using STARTTLS on port 25 or 587, an admin console on a high port and a VPN gateway may each present a different certificate. The OpenSSL documentation for the s_client tool lists a -starttls option for mail protocols and a -servername option that sets the name sent to the server. The second matters because one address can serve several certificates depending on the name requested.
Building the inventory
Our recommendation is a simple table with one row per certificate:
| Field | Why |
|---|---|
| Names covered | So you can match it to services |
| Issuer | Shows which CA, and whether it is public or private |
| Not valid after (expiry date) | Drives the renewal calendar |
| Where served | From the endpoint reads |
| Seen in CT | Yes or no, from the log search |
| Owner | A named person or team |
| Renewal method | Automatic, manual or supplier-managed |
| Who is alerted | A role mailbox, not one person |
Build it in four steps.
- List your names. Start from your DNS records, load balancer and web server configurations, and your supplier list. Add the names you suspect exist but cannot find.
- Search CT for each registered domain. Use a monitor or search service. Record every certificate that has not yet expired.
- Read each endpoint. Record the presented certificate for every name and port in your list.
- Compare. Mark each certificate as matched, issued-but-not-served, served-but-not-in-CT, or unknown.
What to do with the differences
- Issued but not served. Possibly a retired server, a test, a supplier's service, or a certificate you should not have. Ask who requested it. If nobody did, treat it as possible misissue and tell your CA.
- Served but not in CT. Probably a private or self-signed certificate. Add it to the inventory and give it an owner. Internal certificates expire too.
- Unknown names or unknown issuers. Escalate. This is the case CT monitoring exists for.
- Everything matched but expiring soon. Check the renewal method is working, not just configured.
Then agree who watches. A monitor that emails an unattended address is no better than no monitor. Decide who receives CT alerts, who reviews the inventory (we suggest quarterly), and who may request new certificates.
Read-only checks
These commands read public information. We did not test them. Run them only against hosts you are authorised to check. The s_client page warns that the tool is a test tool and "will accept any certificate chain (trusted or not) sent by the peer". So the output shows what a server presents, not whether it should be trusted. It also notes that in non-interactive use, with TLS 1.3, the tool can close the connection early.
Linux shell (OpenSSL 3.0 documentation; -connect, -servername, -noout, -subject, -issuer, -dates and -ext are described in the s_client and x509 pages; x509 reads standard input by default):
openssl s_client -connect www.example.com:443 -servername www.example.com </dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer -dates -ext subjectAltName
Repeat for each name and port. For a mail server using STARTTLS, add -starttls smtp to the first command and use the mail port. Record the subject, issuer, expiry date and the list of names.
For CT, open a search service from the CT project's monitor list in a browser and search your domain. One example is crt.sh, a certificate search page run by Sectigo. We have not documented its query options here; read the service's own help.
A worked example (illustrative)
The following is invented. A small firm owns one domain. Its inventory lists three certificates: the website, a customer portal and a mail server. A CT search finds five unexpired certificates. Two are unfamiliar names on the firm's domain: a staging site from a former web agency, and a name for a payments tool that a manager signed up to without telling IT.
The endpoint reads show the staging site no longer answers, and the payments tool is hosted by its supplier, who manages renewal. The firm records the staging certificate for revocation with the agency's help, writes the supplier into the inventory with a named contact, and adds a quarterly CT search to the IT calendar. A fourth certificate, on an internal management console from a private CA, never appears in CT. The endpoint read finds it, and it expires in 40 days.
Read next
Related articles you may want next.
- HostingReplacing a certificate after its private key is exposed: how fast revocation must happenA leaked certificate private key needs a new key, a new certificate and a prompt revocation request. What the 24-hour rule covers, and how optional OCSP changes it.Read article
- HostingShorter TLS certificate lifetimes: the 2026 to 2029 schedule and what to automateThe CA/Browser Forum schedule cutting TLS certificate lifetimes to 200, 100 and 47 days, and how to decide which renewals to automate first.Read article
- HostingWildcard or individual certificates for hosted services: what a shared key puts at riskA wildcard certificate covers the single-label names under a domain with one private key. Where it is reasonable, what it risks, and what to ask your host.Read article
Risks and limits
- No method finds every certificate. Private CA certificates, services on addresses or ports you do not probe, and certificates for names you did not search are all outside what this finds.
- CT logs are public, but monitoring services differ in coverage, delay and cost. We have not tested any.
- Log entries show issuance, not use. An unexpected entry is a question to investigate, not proof of an attack.
- Endpoint tools show what is presented to you. A service that behaves differently by source address, or behind a firewall, may present something else to others.
- The OpenSSL command was not tested, and its output format may differ between versions.
- This article does not cover revocation. Revocation and key compromise are for another topic.
Next step
Search the CT logs for your business domains this week, and list every unexpired certificate you find, next to a named owner. If you are reviewing a hosted service, the Managed Services page is a starting point for that conversation; ask for the scope in writing.
Sources
- Ending Support for Expiration Notification Emails, Let's Encrypt, 22 January 2025.
- DNS Infrastructure Hijacking Campaign (AA19-024A), CISA, last revised 13 February 2019 (read through an Internet Archive copy captured 20 October 2026, which carries CISA's archived-content notice).
- RFC 6962: Certificate Transparency, IETF, June 2013.
- RFC 9162: Certificate Transparency Version 2.0, IETF, December 2021.
- How CT works, Certificate Transparency project, date unavailable.
- Monitors, Certificate Transparency project, date unavailable.
- Chrome Certificate Transparency Policy, Google Chrome, date unavailable.
- Apple's Certificate Transparency policy, Apple, published 21 April 2025.
- Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs, Let's Encrypt, last updated 4 September 2026.
- openssl-s_client, OpenSSL Documentation, version 3.0, date unavailable.
- openssl-x509, OpenSSL Documentation, version 3.0, date unavailable.
- crt.sh, Sectigo, date unavailable (search form only).
All accessed 15 November 2026.
Learning notes
- CT logs list certificates that public CAs issued for your names, including ones you never requested.
- A log entry says a certificate exists. It does not say where, or whether, it is used.
- Reading each service shows what is really presented, including private CA certificates that logs never see.
- Compare the two lists and give every certificate an owner and a shared alert address.
- Neither method finds everything, so repeat them on a schedule.
This article was originally published on .