About this article: This article is reviewed against the cited sources. This is source research, not lab validation. Check the stated versions and your own requirements before making changes.
The maximum lifetime of a publicly trusted TLS certificate (the kind browsers accept for a website) is stepping down in three stages. For certificates issued on or after 15 March 2026 and before 15 March 2027, the maximum is 200 days. On or after 15 March 2027 and before 15 March 2029, it is 100 days. On or after 15 March 2029, it is 47 days. These figures come from section 6.3.2 of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements (version 2.3.1, dated 4 October 2026).
It is 15 November 2026, so the first step has already applied for eight months. Any certificate you buy or issue today lasts at most 200 days. The step that breaks hand-renewal habits for most businesses is the second, in March 2027, and by the third a manual process is likely to become unreliable (our reading). The rules apply to certificates, not to how you renew them, so the practical question is which renewals you can still safely do by hand, and which must become automatic first.
Why it matters
A certificate that expires unnoticed takes a website, a mail gateway or a login portal offline. That failure is covered elsewhere. This article is about the arithmetic: the shorter the lifetime, the more often a human must act, and the more chances there are to forget.
A certificate that lasted 398 days gave roughly one renewal a year. A 47-day certificate means a renewal roughly every month and a half. For a business with twenty certificates, that is the difference between twenty to thirty renewals a year and well over two hundred (our calculation: see below). Hand-renewal at that rate is a risk and a workload, so the sensible response is automation, plus a reliable list of what you have.
The schedule in full
The Baseline Requirements set the maximum validity period by issue date (section 6.3.2):
| Issued | Maximum validity |
|---|---|
| Before 15 March 2026 | 398 days |
| 15 March 2026 to before 15 March 2027 | 200 days |
| 15 March 2027 to before 15 March 2029 | 100 days |
| On or after 15 March 2029 | 47 days |
Three details are easy to miss. First, the limits attach to the issue date, so a certificate issued under an earlier stage keeps its lifetime until it expires (our reading of the issue-date wording). Second, the text sets lower thresholds at which a certificate SHOULD NOT exceed the length, at 199, 99 and 46 days. Third, it adds that certificates "SHOULD NOT be issued for the maximum permissible time by default", to allow for adjustments in how days are counted. Plan on a little less than the maximum.
The Forum voted the schedule through as ballot SC081v3 in April 2025. Its results page lists 25 certificate issuers voting yes, none no and five abstaining, and all four certificate-consumer (browser) members, Apple, Google, Microsoft and Mozilla, voting yes.
What changes at the same time: re-validation
A certificate authority (CA) must confirm that you control a domain before it issues. It may reuse an earlier confirmation for a limited time, and that reuse period is shrinking on the same dates (section 4.2.1 and the Relevant Dates table in section 1.2.2):
- 15 March 2026: domain name validation reuse falls to 200 days.
- 15 March 2027: it falls to 100 days.
- 15 March 2029: it falls to 10 days.
The ballot text describes the aim as an eventual reduction of "SAN validation data reuse from 398 days to 10 days". In practice, by 2029 nearly every issuance needs a fresh proof of control, unless a method that keeps a standing DNS record is used. Section 3.2.2.4.22 defines one, a DNS TXT record with a persistent value, and says CAs MUST consider "10 days as the maximum validation data reuse period" for it. Let's Encrypt describes the same idea as DNS-PERSIST-01, which it was working to standardise, and says the DNS entry "does not have to change every renewal".
Some validation methods are also being retired, which matters if your renewals depend on an email approval. Section 3.2.2.4.4 (email to a constructed address, such as admin@ or webmaster@ the domain) says that from 15 March 2026 the method SHOULD NOT be used to issue certificates. The Relevant Dates table says that from 15 March 2028 that method (3.2.2.4.4) and the email methods using DNS CAA and TXT contacts (3.2.2.4.13 and 3.2.2.4.14) are not to be relied on. The phone-contact methods (3.2.2.4.16 and 3.2.2.4.17) are barred from 15 March 2027. Our reading: renewals that rely on someone approving an email will not survive the later stages, so the renewal process itself has to change, not only its frequency.
What the schedule does not cover
The Baseline Requirements apply to certificates "intended to be used for authenticating servers accessible through the Internet", according to the ballot's background. Certificates from a private internal CA, and certificates for other purposes, are not directly in scope, though a vendor or internal policy may impose similar limits. Check each case.
The ballot also points out that the Requirements already expect fast replacement: CAs must revoke certificates within 24 hours under certain circumstances, so certificates are understood to be managed so as to "allow for certificate replacement within any given 24 hour period". That is another argument for automation.
One CA's rollout
Individual CAs set their own dates within the Forum's limits. As announced on 2 December 2025, Let's Encrypt planned a 45-day opt-in profile from May 2026, a change of its default profile to 64-day certificates with a 10-day authorisation reuse period from 10 February 2027, and 45-day certificates with a seven-hour reuse period from 16 February 2028. Treat these as the announced plan; some dates have passed and we have not checked what happened.
Two pieces of its advice apply to any CA. Manual renewal "is not recommended", because it will need to be done more often. And a renewal job on a fixed interval must be checked: a hardcoded 60-day interval "will no longer be sufficient" for 45-day certificates. Its guide suggests renewing when a third of the lifetime remains and checking ACME Renewal Information. ACME, the Automatic Certificate Management Environment, is the protocol standardised in RFC 8555 that lets software request and renew certificates without a person.
The arithmetic of renewal
This is our calculation, to show scale. If a certificate is renewed when two-thirds of its lifetime has passed (in line with the Let's Encrypt guidance above), one certificate needs roughly:
| Lifetime | Renews every about | Per year, about |
|---|---|---|
| 398 days | 265 days | 1.4 |
| 200 days | 133 days | 2.7 |
| 100 days | 67 days | 5.5 |
| 47 days | 31 days | 11.7 |
For thirty certificates managed by hand, that is about 41 renewals a year at 398 days and about 350 at 47 days. The number of certificates, not the length of one renewal, is what breaks the manual process.
Deciding what to automate first
Our recommendation:
- Inventory first. List every certificate by hostname, issuer, expiry, who renews it and how. You cannot automate what you cannot see.
- Public websites and portals on systems you control. Automate these first; they are the most numerous and the simplest to automate with an ACME client.
- Certificates installed on devices that cannot run an ACME client, such as some appliances. Ask the vendor whether renewal can be automated. If not, consider ending TLS at a system that can, and keeping the device behind it.
- Certificates managed by a provider or SaaS vendor on your domain. Ask who renews, how you will know if it fails, and what the schedule means for them.
- Renewal by email approval or manual DNS edits. Replace this with DNS automation or a persistent record method before the March 2027 and March 2028 changes.
- Monitoring. Alert if a certificate is not renewed when expected, and check the end result in addition to the job. Let's Encrypt recommends monitoring for this.
Read-only checks
These checks change nothing. We have not tested them against your systems.
- In a browser, open a site's certificate details and note the issuer and the valid-from and valid-to dates. The gap is the lifetime.
- Ask your provider for an export of certificates it manages, with expiry dates.
- Review your calendar or ticket reminders for renewals, and compare against the list.
- Look at your ACME client's schedule, if you have one, and check it renews at a fraction of the lifetime rather than a fixed number of days.
Questions to put to your provider
- Which of our certificates do you renew, and are they renewed automatically?
- How are we told if a renewal fails, and how soon?
- How do you prove control of our domains: which method, and does it need our action?
- What will you change before March 2027, and before March 2029?
- Can we see an expiry list for all certificates you manage on our behalf?
A worked example (illustrative)
The following is invented. A small firm has eleven certificates: five public websites, a mail gateway, a VPN appliance, a booking portal run by a vendor on the firm's domain, and three internal ones from a private CA. Today its administrator renews the public ones by email approval each year.
The inventory shows the three internal certificates are outside the public schedule. The booking portal is the vendor's job, so the firm asks the vendor in writing how renewals are done. The five websites move to automatic renewal using DNS records. The VPN appliance cannot renew automatically, so the firm asks the vendor about support and plans to review it before March 2027. The mail gateway is added to a monitoring list with an alert at 21 days before expiry.
Read next
Related articles you may want next.
- HostingACME challenge types: choosing HTTP-01, DNS-01 or TLS-ALPN-01 for each certificateHow HTTP-01, DNS-01 and TLS-ALPN-01 validate a domain, what access each needs, and how to choose one per certificate so renewals keep working.Read article
- HostingReplacing a certificate after its private key is exposed: how fast revocation must happenA leaked certificate private key needs a new key, a new certificate and a prompt revocation request. What the 24-hour rule covers, and how optional OCSP changes it.Read article
- HostingFinding every certificate before it expires: certificate transparency logs and endpoint readsUse certificate transparency logs and endpoint reads to find forgotten, unknown or unauthorised certificates for your domains before they expire.Read article
Risks and limits
- The schedule is a rule of the CA/Browser Forum, enforced through browser and CA policies; later ballots may change it. The ballot says it keeps room to incorporate new information.
- Different CAs and products have different automation support. Not all ACME clients support every feature.
- We did not test any automation product. The arithmetic is our illustration.
- The Let's Encrypt dates are the announced plan from December 2025.
- Private CA certificates and non-web certificates may follow other rules.
Next step
List every certificate your business renews by hand, with its hostname, issuer, expiry date and the person who renews it, and mark those that cannot be automated. If you are reviewing a hosted service, the Managed Services page is a starting point for that conversation; ask for the scope in writing.
Sources
- Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates (latest, version 2.3.1), CA/Browser Forum, dated 4 October 2026.
- Ballot SC081v3: Introduce Schedule of Reducing Validity and Data Reuse Periods, CA/Browser Forum, 11 April 2025.
- Decreasing Certificate Lifetimes to 45 Days, Let's Encrypt, 2 December 2025.
- Integration Guide, Let's Encrypt, last updated 23 June 2025.
- RFC 8555: Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME), IETF, March 2019.
All accessed 15 November 2026.
Learning notes
- A certificate lifetime is the maximum, and the date it was issued decides which maximum applies.
- Shorter lifetimes mean more renewals; the number of certificates is what overwhelms a manual process.
- Proving control of a domain is becoming as frequent as renewing; plan for both.
- Start with an inventory: you cannot automate what is not on a list.
This article was originally published on .