About this article: This article is reviewed against the cited sources. This is source research, not lab validation. Check the stated versions and your own requirements before making changes.
When a certificate authority (CA) issues a certificate automatically, it first needs proof that the requester controls the domain name. The ACME protocol (the standard that automated renewal tools use) calls that proof a "challenge". There are three common types. HTTP-01 puts a small file on your web server. DNS-01 puts a record in your DNS. TLS-ALPN-01 answers a special request at the TLS layer.
The short answer: HTTP-01 suits an ordinary public website on one name. DNS-01 is the only one of the three that can validate a wildcard name, and it suits servers that are not reachable from the internet, at the price of giving your renewal tool write access to DNS. TLS-ALPN-01 is a narrow option for products that terminate TLS on port 443 and cannot use port 80. The right choice is the one whose required access you can actually provide, from the places the CA validates from, every time a renewal runs.
Why it matters
Renewal is not a one-off task, and it is getting more frequent. The CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (the rules public CAs follow), version 2.3.1, set a 200-day maximum certificate lifetime from 15 March 2026, 100 days from 15 March 2027 and 47 days from 15 March 2029 (Baseline Requirements, section 1.2.2). The same table shortens how long an earlier domain validation may be reused, to 200 days now, 100 days from March 2027 and 10 days from March 2029 (section 4.2.1).
Our reading: as reuse windows shrink, almost every renewal will need a fresh, successful challenge. A challenge that depends on a person, an open firewall rule someone forgot, or a DNS login nobody can find becomes an outage that recurs on a schedule.
What a challenge proves
RFC 8555 says a challenge must show that the requester holds the private key of the ACME account key pair and controls the identifier (the domain name). The client requests a certificate, the CA hands over a random token, and the client publishes something derived from that token and its account key. The CA then looks for it.
Two points follow. The challenge proves control of the name at one moment, not ownership of the domain. And the CA looks from the outside, so it sees what the internet sees, not what your office network sees.
HTTP-01: a file on port 80
With HTTP-01 the client places a file at a path under /.well-known/acme-challenge/ on the web server for that name. RFC 8555 section 8.3 says "the challenge must be completed over HTTP, not HTTPS", and Let's Encrypt says it can only be done on port 80.
Let's Encrypt describes the following details of its own validation:
- It may fetch the file more than once, from more than one vantage point (network location).
- It follows up to 10 redirects, only to http or https, and only to ports 80 or 443.
- It does not check the certificate when redirected to HTTPS.
The same page lists the limits. It does not work if port 80 is blocked, and "This challenge cannot be used to issue wildcard certificates." With several web servers it still works, but only if the file is available on all of them: "you have to make sure the file is available on all of them."
Our reading of what this means: a website that redirects all HTTP to HTTPS is fine, because redirects are followed. A firewall rule that allows port 80 only from selected countries, or a web application firewall that challenges unknown visitors, can fail validation even though ordinary visitors see nothing wrong.
DNS-01: a record in your DNS
With DNS-01 the client creates a TXT record (a text entry in DNS) at _acme-challenge. followed by the name being validated. RFC 8555 section 8.4 says the client SHOULD remove the record once the challenge finishes, and Let's Encrypt advises cleaning up old records because an oversized response will be rejected.
The strengths, from Let's Encrypt: it can issue wildcard names, it works with multiple web servers, and it can validate names whose web servers are not exposed to the public internet. The weaknesses are all about the access it needs:
- The renewal tool needs credentials that can change DNS. Let's Encrypt warns that "putting your full DNS API credentials on your web server significantly increases the impact if that web server is hacked", and suggests narrowly scoped credentials or validating from a separate server.
- Your DNS provider needs an interface (an API) the tool can use. Not every provider has one.
- Changes take time to spread. Let's Encrypt says clients sometimes have to wait "as much as an hour" if the provider offers no way to check.
Because the CA follows ordinary DNS rules, the _acme-challenge name can be a CNAME (an alias) pointing to a zone you control for validation only. Let's Encrypt describes this as a way to delegate answering the challenge to a separate zone. Our recommendation: where DNS-01 is needed and the main DNS provider has weak access controls, this keeps the powerful credentials away from the web servers.
TLS-ALPN-01: a special TLS handshake
RFC 8737 defines a challenge answered on port 443. The client configures its TLS server to return a self-signed certificate carrying a particular extension when a connection negotiates a special protocol name (acme-tls/1). The RFC says the method requires changes by service providers, "making it explicitly an opt-in process", and that it lets hosting providers, content delivery networks and TLS-terminating load balancers validate control without changing how their back-end web servers handle requests.
Let's Encrypt says it "is not suitable for most people", that client support is limited, and that it cannot validate wildcard names. It works when port 80 is unavailable.
What each one needs
The following table is our summary of the sources above.
| Challenge | What the CA must reach | What you must be able to do | Wildcard names |
|---|---|---|---|
| HTTP-01 | The name on port 80, from several places | Serve a file on that name, on every server that answers | No (Let's Encrypt) |
| DNS-01 | Your public DNS | Create and remove a TXT record, or delegate the name to a zone you control | Yes |
| TLS-ALPN-01 | The name on port 443 | Run a TLS terminator that supports the challenge | No (Let's Encrypt) |
The Baseline Requirements list these methods separately: DNS change (section 3.2.2.4.7), an ACME version of the website method (3.2.2.4.19) and TLS using ALPN (3.2.2.4.20). They also say a token may not be used for more than 30 days, and that a CA must corroborate validation from multiple network perspectives (3.2.2.9). Our reading: that is the rule behind the multiple-vantage-point behaviour.
DNS also matters for the other two. From 15 March 2026 the Requirements say a CA must perform DNSSEC validation on DNS queries made during validation (section 1.2.2 and 3.2.2.4). Our reading: if your domain is DNSSEC-signed and the signatures are broken, any challenge type can fail.
Choosing per certificate
Work through each certificate on your list in this order. This is our recommendation.
- Does it include a wildcard name? Then you need DNS-01, or a service that manages that on your behalf.
- Is the server reachable from the internet on port 80, with no source restrictions? Then HTTP-01 is the simplest.
- Is it internal, or behind a firewall that stays closed? Then DNS-01 is the realistic choice, because the CA only needs your public DNS.
- Are there several servers behind one name? DNS-01 avoids copying a file to all of them. HTTP-01 works only if every server answers the same.
- Is port 80 closed but 443 open on a product that supports it? Then TLS-ALPN-01 may fit. Confirm the product documents it first.
Then decide who holds the access. Agree in writing who owns the DNS account, who can create API credentials, whether those credentials are limited to the _acme-challenge names, and where they are stored.
You can also narrow what a CA will accept. The CAA record (a DNS record naming which CAs may issue) can carry a validation-methods setting. Let's Encrypt's CAA page gives the example of restricting a CA to tls-alpn-01 only. If you set that, make sure it matches the challenge you actually use, or renewals will be refused.
Read-only checks
The commands below only read public information. We did not test them. Replace the example names with your own, and run the web check from outside your office network, for example from a phone hotspot, so you see what the CA would see.
Linux shell (curl; options -s, -S, -I and --max-time are described in the curl manual):
curl -sS -I --max-time 10 http://www.example.com/
The first line shows the status and a Location header shows any redirect. A connection error suggests port 80 is blocked from where you ran it.
Linux shell (dig; +short is described in the BIND 9 manual pages):
dig +short TXT _acme-challenge.www.example.com
dig +short CNAME _acme-challenge.www.example.com
PowerShell (-Name and -Type are described in the Resolve-DnsName reference):
Resolve-DnsName -Name _acme-challenge.www.example.com -Type TXT
Resolve-DnsName -Name _acme-challenge.www.example.com -Type CNAME
An empty answer between renewals is normal. A long list of old TXT records suggests the tool is not cleaning up. A CNAME shows the validation name is delegated.
Questions to put to your provider
- Which challenge does each managed certificate use, and why?
- Whose DNS account and credentials are involved, and how are they scoped?
- Does any firewall, web application firewall or geographic restriction sit in front of port 80?
- How do we find out if a renewal fails, and how early?
- Is there a test (staging) renewal we can watch? Let's Encrypt recommends testing against its staging environment, which has much higher failure limits than production.
That last point matters because production limits are tight: Let's Encrypt's rate limits allow up to 5 authorisation failures per identifier per account each hour. Repeated failed retries can lock you out for a while.
A worked example (illustrative)
The following is invented. A firm runs a public website, a customer portal on three servers behind a load balancer, a staff-only intranet that is not on the internet, and a mail gateway with no website. It also wants one wildcard certificate for a set of customer-facing names.
- The website uses HTTP-01, after the firm confirms its firewall allows port 80 from anywhere.
- The portal uses DNS-01, so no file has to be copied to three servers.
- The intranet uses DNS-01, because the CA cannot reach it.
- The mail gateway uses DNS-01, because it has no web server to hold a file.
- The wildcard uses DNS-01, the only option.
The firm sets up one low-privilege DNS credential limited to the validation names, and points _acme-challenge for the intranet and wildcard at a small separate zone. It writes down who owns the DNS account. It then watches one staging renewal before relying on production.
Read next
Related articles you may want next.
- HostingCAA records: limiting which certificate authorities can issue for your domainWhat a CAA DNS record stops, what it cannot, and how a wrong record or DNS fault can block your own certificate renewals.Read article
- HostingWildcard or individual certificates for hosted services: what a shared key puts at riskA wildcard certificate covers the single-label names under a domain with one private key. Where it is reasonable, what it risks, and what to ask your host.Read article
- HostingShorter TLS certificate lifetimes: the 2026 to 2029 schedule and what to automateThe CA/Browser Forum schedule cutting TLS certificate lifetimes to 200, 100 and 47 days, and how to decide which renewals to automate first.Read article
Risks and limits
- This article relies on Let's Encrypt for the practical details. Other CAs may support different challenges or add rules. Check your CA's documentation.
- The Baseline Requirements list further methods, including a newer persistent DNS record method (section 3.2.2.4.22). We have not verified that any particular CA or tool supports it.
- Dates in the Requirements that fall after today may change.
- A challenge proves control at one moment. It does not guard against someone who already controls your DNS or web server.
- Commands were not tested.
- Clients differ in how they handle propagation delay and cleanup. Read your client's documentation.
Next step
List every certificate you rely on, note the names it covers, and write next to each the challenge it can realistically use and who holds the access it needs. If you are reviewing a hosted service, the Managed Services page is a starting point for that conversation; ask for the scope in writing.
Sources
- RFC 8555: Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME), IETF, March 2019.
- RFC 8737: ACME TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Challenge Extension, IETF, February 2020.
- Challenge Types, Let's Encrypt, last updated 12 February 2026.
- Rate Limits, Let's Encrypt, last updated 5 August 2026.
- Staging Environment, Let's Encrypt, last updated 10 April 2026.
- Certification Authority Authorization (CAA), Let's Encrypt, last updated 4 October 2026.
- Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates, version 2.3.1, CA/Browser Forum, 4 October 2026.
- BIND 9 manual pages (dig), Internet Systems Consortium, date unavailable.
- Resolve-DnsName, Microsoft Learn, date unavailable.
- curl manual, curl project, date unavailable.
All accessed 15 November 2026.
Learning notes
- A challenge proves you control a name right now. It does not prove you own the domain.
- HTTP-01 needs port 80 open to the world. DNS-01 needs DNS write access. TLS-ALPN-01 needs port 443 and a product that supports it.
- Wildcard names need DNS-01 with Let's Encrypt, so DNS credentials become part of your security plan.
- Give the renewal tool the smallest DNS access that works, and test with a staging renewal first.
- Shorter certificate lifetimes mean validation happens more often, so a fragile challenge fails more often.
This article was originally published on .