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CAA records: limiting which certificate authorities can issue for your domain

Technical article
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About this article: This article is reviewed against the cited sources. This is source research, not lab validation. Check the stated versions and your own requirements before making changes.

A certificate authority (CA) is a company that issues the certificates behind the padlock in a browser. There are many public CAs, and by default any of them may issue a certificate for your domain if it can check that the requester controls the name. Let's Encrypt puts it this way: "By default, every public CA is allowed to issue certificates for any domain name in the public DNS". It adds that a bug in one CA's validation could therefore affect every domain.

A CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) record is a DNS entry that lists the CAs you permit. The short answer to what it stops is this: it stops a compliant CA you have not listed from issuing, and nothing else. It does not stop a CA you have listed, a non-compliant CA, someone who can edit your DNS, or a certificate already issued. And a wrong record, or a DNS fault that hides a correct one, can stop your own renewals.

Why it matters

A mistaken or malicious issuance of a certificate for your name can let someone impersonate your site or intercept traffic. Two kinds of problem are worth separating. One is a CA's error. The other is an attacker who obtains a certificate by tricking a CA's validation, for example through a hijack of internet routes, which the Baseline Requirements name as a risk that checking from several network locations is meant to reduce (section 3.2.2.9).

RFC 8659 describes CAA as a way to "reduce the risk of unintended certificate mis-issue". The CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (the rules public CAs follow), version 2.3.1, make CAA checking a requirement: section 4.2.2.1 says a CA must retrieve and process CAA records, and that a certificate may only be issued within the record's time to live (TTL, how long answers may be cached) or 8 hours, whichever is greater.

How a CAA record is read

A CAA record has three parts: a flag, a tag and a value. The most common tags are issue (which CA may issue), issuewild (which CA may issue wildcard names) and iodef (where to report refused requests). The value of issue names the CA by a domain name that the CA publishes in its practice statement. For Let's Encrypt that is letsencrypt.org, according to its own page.

An example set, using a made-up CA:

example.com.   CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net"
example.com.   CAA 0 issuewild "ca.example.net"
example.com.   CAA 0 iodef "mailto:certificates@example.com"

Several rules decide what a CA must do:

  • No record, no restriction. A set that contains no restricting tag does not restrict issuance (RFC 8659, section 3).
  • The closest record wins. The CA climbs the DNS name tree from the requested name upward until it finds a CAA set. Let's Encrypt says "the CA will always respect the CAA record closest to the domain name it is issuing a certificate for". A record on your main domain covers the subdomains. A record on a subdomain overrides it for that subdomain.
  • Aliases are followed. If a name is a CNAME to another name, the CA reads the CAA records at the target.
  • Records add up. Several records of one tag are additive: if any permits the CA, it is allowed.
  • Wildcards. A wildcard issuewild record takes precedence over issue for wildcard names.
  • Deny all. RFC 8659 shows that an issue record with no CA name, written as a semicolon, asks that no CA issue.
  • The critical flag. If the flag is set on a tag the CA does not understand, the CA must not issue.

Let's Encrypt suggests setting records on the registered domain (the name you registered, such as the main business domain). Our recommendation: add subdomain records only where you have a reason.

What CAA stops

It stops a compliant CA that is not listed from issuing a certificate for your name. If an unlisted CA has a validation flaw, the CAA check is a second, independent barrier. If you want a CA to report refusals, the iodef property gives it a place to send them. The Baseline Requirements say CAs should send such reports to the contacts in an iodef record if present.

What CAA does not stop

The following points are the limits that RFC 8659 and the CA rules themselves describe.

Situation Why CAA does not help
A CA you listed issues something it should not RFC 8659: "The use of CAA records does not prevent mis-issue by an authorized CA"
A CA that ignores CAA CAA works because CAs follow the rules. RFC 8659 notes that a mis-issue event can cost a CA its embedded trust anchor, but a record cannot force compliance
Someone who can edit your DNS They can change or remove the record. CAA protects against outsiders, not against loss of control of your DNS account
A certificate issued before you published the record RFC 8659: a record "describes only current grants of authority", and relying parties must not use CAA as part of validating a certificate
A private or internal CA Our reading: CAA is aimed at public CAs that follow the Baseline Requirements, and a private CA is not bound by them
Suppression or spoofing of your record RFC 8659 section 5.4 says an attacker who hides a record could obtain a certificate from an unauthorised CA, and recommends DNSSEC checks

Our reading: CAA is one layer. It pairs well with certificate transparency monitoring, which can reveal certificates that were issued anyway, and with tight control of your DNS account, but it does not replace either.

What it can break

This is where a good idea turns into an outage. The failure modes below come from the sources, apart from where we say otherwise.

A CA you actually use is missing. If your certificates come from a hosting provider, content delivery network or software service that obtains them on your behalf, that provider's CA must be on the list. Our recommendation: before you publish, find out which CA each certificate currently uses (a certificate inventory helps here; see the related topic on finding every certificate, listed below).

A wildcard is blocked. A set that allows a CA for plain names but has an issuewild record for another CA will refuse wildcard requests from the first.

A parent record blocks a subdomain. Because the search climbs the tree, a record on the main domain can block a supplier who issues certificates for a subdomain, unless the subdomain has its own record.

The DNS answer is an error. Let's Encrypt checks CAA before every certificate it issues and says it sometimes gets errors "even for domains that haven't set any CAA records". When the CA gets an error, it cannot tell whether issuance is allowed. Under the Baseline Requirements (section 4.2.2.2.5), DNSSEC validation errors such as SERVFAIL must not be treated as permission to issue. Let's Encrypt gives the common causes: a DNSSEC validation failure, or authoritative name servers that mishandle unknown record types. It says the provider "does not need to specifically support CAA records; it only needs to reply with a NOERROR response for unknown query types". RFC 8659 section 6 lists blocked queries, rejected queries and bogus DNSSEC responses as deployment problems.

An optional restriction does not match. RFC 8657 defines two parameters that can follow the CA name. accounturi limits issuance to a specific account at the CA, so someone who hijacks your domain without your account key cannot use it. validationmethods limits which validation methods the CA may use. Both can block you if the account or the method you actually use is not the one named. The Baseline Requirements say that from 15 March 2027 CAs must process these parameters, which is a future date and may change.

Caching delays changes. Because of the TTL rule in section 4.2.2.1, a change may not take effect everywhere at once. Our reading: allow for that when you add a CA before a renewal.

Choosing what to publish

Work in this order. This is our recommendation.

  1. List the CAs you use now and the CAs your suppliers use for your names.
  2. Decide which you will allow, including any you plan to move to within the year.
  3. Check your DNS provider answers CAA queries correctly for your domain, before you publish.
  4. Publish issue records for the allowed CAs. Add issuewild only if wildcards need different rules, and add iodef only if a monitored mailbox exists.
  5. Consider accounturi once renewals are stable. It adds protection and adds a way to break renewals when an account changes.
  6. Record who may change CAA records, and put CAA changes through the same approval as other DNS changes.
  7. Test a renewal in the CA's test environment, if it offers one, then watch the next real renewal.

Read-only checks

These commands only read public DNS. We did not test them. Replace the example name with your own.

Linux shell (dig, its record-type argument and the +short option are described in the BIND 9 manual pages):

dig CAA example.com
dig +short CAA www.example.com

Read the answer section. An empty answer for one name does not mean there is no policy: the CA keeps climbing, so check the parent names too (for www.example.com, check example.com). Also check whether any name in the chain is a CNAME.

For Windows, the documented Resolve-DnsName record types do not include CAA, so we give no PowerShell command. Use your DNS provider's console, or run dig from a Linux system.

Questions to put to your provider

  • Which CA issues each of my certificates, and does anything else issue for my names on my behalf?
  • Does the DNS service accept and correctly answer CAA records?
  • Who may change DNS records, and is a change logged and approved?
  • If you manage certificates for me, which CA identifier must I list, and will you tell me if it changes?

A worked example (illustrative)

The following is invented. A firm publishes a CAA record allowing only its main CA, after checking its website certificate. A fortnight later its customer portal, which a software supplier hosts on a subdomain and certifies with a different CA, fails to renew. The portal's certificate expires and customers see warnings.

The firm finds the parent record is being applied to the subdomain. It adds a record on the subdomain naming the supplier's CA, confirms with the supplier which CA identifier to use, and waits out the TTL. It writes a rule that any new service using a different CA needs a CAA change first, and it adds the portal to its certificate inventory with an owner.

Risks and limits

  • CAA depends on CAs following the rules and on DNS being answered correctly.
  • The CA's identifier string is set by each CA, so copy it from the CA's documentation, not from memory.
  • Dates in the Baseline Requirements that are in the future may change.
  • This article does not cover DNSSEC, which affects how CAA records are trusted, beyond the points above.
  • Commands were not tested.

Next step

Run a CAA query on your main domain and each subdomain that serves customers, and write down what you see and which CAs your certificates actually come from. If you are reviewing hosted networking and DNS, the Networking page is a starting point for that conversation; ask for the scope in writing.

Sources

All accessed 15 November 2026.

Learning notes

  • A CAA record says which public CAs may issue for your name. With no record, any of them may.
  • The CA reads the closest record, climbing from the requested name to the parent domains.
  • CAA does not stop a CA you listed, someone who controls your DNS, or certificates already issued.
  • If a CA you use is not listed, or DNS answers CAA queries with an error, your renewal can fail.
  • Check which CAs you really use before you publish a record.